Pundits Explain Why the January 1966 Coup in Nigeria Was Called an Igbo Coup

The January 15, 1966 coup remains one of the most contentious events in Nigeria’s political history, often labeled an Igbo coup by critics and political analysts. This characterization stems from several factors, including the ethnic composition of the coup plotters, the regions that witnessed political assassinations, the response of Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, and the policies enacted following the coup. The debate over whether the coup was ethnically motivated or merely an attempt at correcting political instability continues to generate discussion.

One of the primary reasons the January 1966 coup was referred to as an Igbo coup was the ethnic composition of the military officers who planned and executed it. The coup was largely orchestrated by young army officers, with Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna as the most prominent leaders. While Nzeogwu was born in the North and identified with the region, his ethnic roots were Igbo, and Ifeajuna was also Igbo. Many of their co-conspirators, including Majors Don Okafor, Humphrey Chukwuka, and Christian Anuforo, were also Igbo. The fact that the plotters were predominantly from one ethnic group fueled suspicions that the coup was an attempt by Igbo officers to dominate the political landscape of Nigeria.

Another factor that contributed to the perception of the coup as an Igbo-led operation was the pattern of assassinations that took place. The coup resulted in the deaths of prominent political and military figures, but a closer look at the casualties reveals an ethnic imbalance. Among those killed were Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Premier of the Northern Region Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of the Western Region Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, Minister of Finance Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, and top military officers like Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun and Colonel Ralph Shodeinde. However, notable Igbo politicians, including Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was the ceremonial President at the time, and Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of the Eastern Region, were left unharmed. This selective targeting led many to believe that the coup was designed to eliminate non-Igbo leaders while preserving Igbo political influence.

Additionally, the absence of bloodshed in certain regions reinforced the notion of ethnic favoritism. In Northern and Western Nigeria, where political killings took place, the coup was brutally executed, leading to the deaths of key political and military figures. However, in Enugu, the capital of the Eastern Region, and Benin, the capital of the Mid-West Region, there were no significant casualties. In Enugu, Premier Michael Okpara was placed under house arrest but was not killed, and in Benin, there were no reported casualties. This contrast with the violence in other regions deepened suspicions that the coup was orchestrated to benefit the Igbo and ensure their political survival.

The response of Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, who emerged as the Head of State following the coup, further fueled accusations of ethnic bias. Although Ironsi was not directly involved in planning the coup, he became the primary beneficiary after successfully quelling the coup and assuming control of the country. One of the most contentious issues was his handling of the coup plotters. Instead of swiftly court-martialing and executing them, as was expected in military tradition, Ironsi detained them without taking immediate punitive action. This leniency led many, particularly in the Northern and Western regions, to believe that Ironsi was protecting fellow Igbo officers. The failure to mete out swift justice to the coup plotters became a rallying point for resentment, particularly in the North, where it was perceived as a cover-up to shield Igbo conspirators.

Further exacerbating tensions was Ironsi’s enactment of the Unification Decree, which abolished Nigeria’s federal structure in favor of a unitary system of government. Prior to the coup, Nigeria operated as a federation, with each region enjoying a degree of autonomy. The decree centralized power in the federal government, effectively dismantling the regional autonomy that had defined Nigeria’s governance. Given that the Igbo were widely perceived as enterprising and dominant in business and administration, many non-Igbo groups, particularly in the North, viewed the decree as an attempt to impose Igbo control over the entire country. This perception intensified ethnic animosities and contributed to the belief that the coup and subsequent policies were designed to advance Igbo interests.

The role of the media in shaping the narrative of the January 1966 coup also played a significant part in its characterization as an Igbo coup. Nigerian newspapers and international media outlets covered the events extensively, and the ethnic composition of the coup plotters became a focal point. Reports highlighted the fact that the majority of the officers involved were Igbo and that Igbo politicians were largely spared. Political commentators and rival politicians seized on these narratives to further entrench the belief that the coup was an Igbo-driven conspiracy. This portrayal, whether accurate or exaggerated, cemented the perception of ethnic bias in the minds of many Nigerians.

In the months following the coup, ethnic tensions escalated, leading to widespread unrest and violence. The perception that the coup was an Igbo plot against other ethnic groups contributed to retaliatory attacks, particularly in the North. By July 1966, a counter-coup was staged, led by Northern officers, resulting in the assassination of General Ironsi and his replacement by Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon. The July coup marked the beginning of a cycle of ethnic violence, culminating in the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), which saw the attempted secession of Biafra, predominantly inhabited by the Igbo.

The labeling of the January 1966 coup as an Igbo coup remains a subject of historical debate. While some argue that the ethnic composition of the coup plotters and the selective assassinations provide evidence of an Igbo agenda, others contend that the coup was primarily driven by a desire to address political corruption and instability. Supporters of this view point out that the January 1966 coup had participants that are not Igbo, such as Major Adewale Ademoyega, who was Yoruba, and Lieutenant John Atom Kpera, a Northern officer who played a role in the Kaduna operation. They argue that the coup was not about ethnic supremacy but rather an attempt by a group of disillusioned military officers to rectify the perceived failings of Nigeria’s political elite.

It is however worthy of note that the dominance of Igbo officers among the coup plotters was not unconnected with the sheer dominance of the number of Igbo officers in the Nigerian Army then. Further more, a number of accounts including Ben Gbulie's Five Majors reported details for flying to Calabar to release Awolowo (a Yoruba) from the prison to install him as the President, as part of the cop plans. What is more? Dr M.I. Okpara was spared as he hosted Archbishop Macarios of Cyprus in his Enugu residence when Lt. Oguchi came to implement the coup orders, and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe was overseas on medical grounds.

Ultimately, the January 1966 coup set in motion a series of events that profoundly shaped Nigeria’s political trajectory. The ethnic suspicions it generated laid the groundwork for subsequent crises, making it one of the most pivotal moments in the country’s history. Whether it was an Igbo coup or not, the perception of it as such had lasting implications, fueling ethnic divisions that continue to influence Nigerian politics today. The debates surrounding the coup illustrate the complexities of Nigerian history, where fact and perception often intertwine to shape national consciousness.